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Was the German Battlefleet Programme the Main Reason for the End of Britain’s
“Splendid Isolation”?
Abstract
This historiographical essay challenges the common historical narrative that Britain left 'splendid
isolation' as a result of perceived German aggression - particularly considering Germany's battlefleet
programme. Investigating closer Anglo-American ties, the Anglo-Japanese agreement and the Entente
Cordiale show that Britain started to abandon an isolationist policy due to its vast, global and often
burdensome empire before the German battlefleet started to present itself as a problem. Rather than
pinning Britain's alliances at the turn of the twentieth-century on one factor in Europe, this essay
investigates the impact the Americas, Africa, Central Asia and the Far East had on Britain's changing
international position.
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Was the German Battlefleet Programme the Main Reason for the
End of Britain’s “Splendid Isolation”?
Nathan Brewster
Introduction
“Splendid isolation” has been, and continues to be, a phrase of
convenience rather than widely agreed and undisputed historical
fact. There remains ambiguity over precisely what it entailed. Lord
Salisbury, British Prime Minister 1895-1902, and Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs from 1895-1900, used the phrase ironically for
those who believed splendid isolation was possible.1 Historians have
mainly argued that the criteria for splendid isolation was either the
absence of a peacetime alliance,2 or an absence from European
involvement. Britain was in isolation in the 1890s and early 1900s,
with a preference for ad hoc, vague agreements rather than concrete
alliances, contrasting with Germany.3 Because of the
historiographical debate over what splendid isolation entailed, there
are debates over when it ended. It has been argued that splendid
isolation ended only when Britain was obligated to become
militarily involved in Europe, which would place the end of splendid
isolation much later. This will not be explored here because it
generally ignores two important points. Firstly, Britain was never
fully obligated to go to war in Europe. Secondly, an involvement did
not have to be militarily, it could be Britain becoming further
diplomatically involved in Europe. Rather, this essay will explore
splendid isolation as both: ending on 30 January 1902, with the
signing of the Anglo-Japanese agreement and ending in 1905-06,
with Britain becoming embroiled in European affairs during the
Moroccan Crisis. The Anglo-Japanese agreement, despite being a
regional pact, ended splendid isolation as it was a peacetime alliance
with terms that theoretically obliged Britain to go to war under
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certain circumstances.4 Furthermore, this regional pact had global
ramifications that impacted Britain’s ‘aloofness from Europe’,5
therefore making void the two aforementioned criteria of splendid
isolation. Conversely, other historians argue that splendid isolation
did not end until Britain was explicitly engaged in European affairs
and quarrels. 6 In this case, the Moroccan Crisis can be seen as the
ending of splendid isolation,7 as Britain explicitly sided with France
against the mercurial Kaiser Wilhelm, thus becoming involved in
Europe.8 This essay will focus on the impact of the German
battlefleet and Paul Kennedy’s notion of ‘imperial overstretch’ on
the Anglo-Japanese agreement and the Moroccan Crisis, as these
two events best represent the end of splendid isolation, depending
which side of the historiographical debate one takes. Imperial
overstretch occurs when the primary global power’s expanded
strategic commitments lead to an increase in military spending that
overburdens their economic strength, which was a key facet in
Britain’s abandonment of splendid isolation.9
Tirpitz’ Battlefleet
The German battlefleet was devised by the State Secretary of the
Imperial Naval Office, Alfred von Tirpitz. The programme
commenced with the Navy Law of 1898, which fixed the number of
battleships to be built each year.10 Bills were regularly passed to
increase the size and strength of the battlefleet with the Second Navy
Law of 1900, and a Novelle in 1908 and 1912.11 The battlefleet was
built with an anti-British focus, shown with Tirpitz’s discussion of
4

George Monger, The End of Isolation. British Foreign Policy 1900-1907
(London: Nelson, 1963), p. 60.
5
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, economic change and
military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1989), p. 252 argues the
Anglo-Japanese agreement had impacts on European relations as it made a thirdparty intervention unlikely from either France or Britain.
6
See A.J.P Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 400 and Thomas Otte, The China question:
great power rivalry and British isolation, 1894-1905 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007), p. 306.
7
For discussions of the events and aftermath of the Moroccan Crisis, see A.J.P
Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, pp. 427-441.
8
Thomas Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: the making of British foreign policy,
1865-1914 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 299.
9
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, economic change and
military conflict from 1500 to 2000, pp. 523-533.
10
Jonathon Steinberg, Yesterday's deterrent: Tirpitz and the birth of the German
battle fleet (Aldershot: Gregg revivals, 1992), p. 190.
11
Michael Ephkenans, ‘The Naval Race before 1914: Was a Peaceful Outcome
Thinkable?’, in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (ed), An Improbable
War: The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before
1914, (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007), p. 133.
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rivalling Britain in preliminary proposals to Kaiser Wilhelm II in
1897.12 Tension with Tirpitz’s naval programme was felt in Britain
as early as 4 February 1898. The First Naval Lord Sir Frederick
Richards argued battleship construction should not be reduced, in
view of what was happening with powers outside France and
Russia.13 However, those were merely rumblings. The impact on
Britain’s foreign policy, caused by the German battlefleet up to the
signing of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, was negligible. In 1902,
the Royal Navy considered France and Russia to be the navies that
were most dangerous to British interests.14 However, the German
battlefleet had a stronger impact on Britain by the time of the
Moroccan Crisis of 1905-6. By 1905, Sir John Fisher, First Sea
Lord, took up various counter-measures to the German fleet,
including concentrating on European waters and maintaining
numerical superiority.15 He even considered a preventative
‘Copenhagen style’ attack on the German fleet, supported by archConservatives in the British parliament,16 but this was opposed by
many more than the few who supported it. In 1905, Tirpitz and the
German Admiralty also prepared for a naval war against Britain,17
however, this was unlikely and is better explained as general ‘worstcase scenario’ planning. Elite and public animosity between
Germany and Britain18 accompanied public rows between German
Chancellor Prince Bulow and Liberal Unionist Joseph
Chamberlain;19 the latter previously being the chief instigator of an
alliance with Germany until 1902.20 However, while tensions
between Britain and Germany, resulting from the German
battlefleet, had palpably risen from 1902 to the Moroccan Crisis, this
should not be overemphasised. The Moroccan Crisis started in
March 1905, whereas Anglo-German naval rivalry did not
exponentially grow until after the launch of the HMS Dreadnought
around a year later, and even then, only became clear around 1908.21
Therefore, the German battlefleet had an incredibly negligible
12

Steinberg, p. 201.
ibid, p. 167.
14
F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European States
System 1814-1914 (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2005), p. 270.
15
Volker Berghahn, Germany and the approach of war in 1914 (London:
Macmillan, 1973), p. 48.
16
Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World
War, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 48.
17
Michael Epkenhans, p. 119.
18
Margaret MacMillan, The War that ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (London:
Profile Books, 2013), p.130.
19
Otte, The Foreign Office mind, p. 274.
13
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Zara Steiner, The foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 500.
21
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 253.
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impact on Britain’s decision to ally with Japan in 1902. Similarly, it
had a minor impact on Britain’s decision to become involved in the
Moroccan Crisis, as the age of Anglo-German Naval rivalry was
later. Thus, another explanation must be given as to why Britain left
splendid isolation and signed a defensive alliance with Japan, and
why they became embroiled in European quarrels during the
Moroccan Crisis siding with France over Germany.
The Anglo-Japanese Agreement
Upon retiring in 1907, Thomas Sanderson, Permanent
Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, described Britain as a ‘huge
giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes
stretching in every direction’. 22 He used this metaphor to refer to
the perception of Britain abroad. Significantly, Britain was not the
only ‘giant’, and was being pressed all over the globe by other Great
Powers with strained resources, resulting in the term ‘imperial
overstretch’. Imperial overstretch would bring Britain to the AngloJapanese agreement and to their stance during the Moroccan Crisis,
thus having an important role in the ending of splendid isolation.
Strained resources were visible in Africa and the Americas, but it
was fear of Russia in the Far East and Central Asia, that dictated
foreign policy. Britain’s imperial overstretch in the Americas is
shown in their dealings with the USA. Britain had started cultivating
a relationship with the USA as early as 1898. The Hay-Pauncefote
treaty, 18 November 1901, demonstrated Britain’s strained
resources and how they needed to look for support. Ultimately, the
treaty recognised British inferiority in American waters.23 The USA
was given the sole right to build a canal from the Atlantic to the
Pacific and simultaneously, the Royal Navy left the Caribbean
where Britain’s interests were now governed by the USA.24 In
return, Britain received cordiality from the USA and vital resources
were freed. While this cannot be deemed the end of splendid
isolation, it is a good example of Britain recognising their ‘imperial
overstretch’ and was a milestone towards the Anglo-Japanese
agreement and the end of splendid isolation.
The Anglo-Japanese agreement was chiefly caused by
imperial overstretch in the Far East and Central Asia, however,
British activities and interest in Africa also played a role, because
imperial overstretch was inextricably linked worldwide. The role
Africa played in the Anglo-Japanese agreement was secondary to
22

Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, p. 312.
David Reynolds, Britannia overruled: British policy and world power in the
twentieth century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p. 70.
24
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the role Asia played, in that African activities- particularly the Boer
War- served to remind Britain of the dangers that Russia posed to
their Asian interests. The European condemnation of the Boer War
of 1899-1902 came as a great shock to Britain’s leaders and
demonstrated Britain’s isolation.25 The real significance of the Boer
War, in the signing of the Anglo-Japanese agreement, was the
impact it had on Britain’s inability to act forcefully in Asia, at a time
when the rest of the world was seemingly focused in this region,
which only intensified the feeling of isolation.26 Fundamentally, the
Boer War highlighted Britain’s imperial overstretch as they were
unable to exhort all their efforts against the bigger threat by Russia
in Asia. Russia took the lead in East Asia, which caused discomfort
for British policy-makers and the Foreign Office.27 Despite the
exhausting efforts on the Boer War, Asia dominated British foreign
policy in the late 1890s and early 1900s. Taylor convincingly argues
’China had overtaken Turkey as the sick man and between 1897 and
1905 the future of China determined the relations between the Great
Powers’,28 which evidently would impact Britain’s stance on
isolation. The Foreign Office had been reorganised with a Far
Eastern Department in 1899,29 shortly after Russia’s seizure of Port
Arthur and Germany’s seizure of Kiaochow.30 Britain wanted an
open door trade policy of China, which made sense for their
economic interests, with two-thirds of Chinese foreign trade being
carried out with Britain.31 This did not marry with Russia’s aims to
take more land for the Russian Empire, with encroachments already
made in Manchuria. 32 Despite a far superior navy, Britain’s army
was ‘puny’ and could never have taken on Russia in the Far East if
it came to war.33 Furthermore, Russia was threatening Britain’s
‘crown jewel’ India, through railways to Afghanistan’s frontier,34
and the loan crisis of Persia in 1900.35 The threat to India through
Russian attention on these two buffer states, led to elite fears in
Britain that they should increase their Indian garrison by 100,000

25

Philip Towle, From Ally to Enemy Anglo Japanese Military relations 1900-45
(Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2006), p. 1.
26
Young, p. 22.
27
Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, p. 236.
28
Taylor, p. 391.
29
Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The diplomacy of two island empires
1894-1907 (London: Athlone Press, 1966), p. 61.
30
Monger, p. 6.
31
M.R.D Foot, p. 19.
32
Monger, p. 18.
33
Young, p. 11.
34
Towle, p. 1.
35
For more in-depth discussion of the loan crisis of Persia and how this
impacted Anglo-Russian relations see Monger, The end of isolation, pp. 50-58.
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troops.36 The contrasting ambitions of Russia and Britain in Asia,
coupled with this military weakness of Britain, was a major factor
in signing the Anglo-Japanese agreement. Britain hoped Japan
would defend their interests in China because certain terms of the
treaty alluded to a ‘defence of interests in China or Korea’.37 Britain
tried to extend the terms to cover Persia, but the Japanese would not
agree. However, the renewal of the agreement in 1905 covered
Persia, which highlights the importance of this buffer state to
Britain.38 Therefore, if one takes the historiographical side, that
splendid isolation ended with Britain’s alliance with Japan, imperial
overstretch played a significant role. Britain turned to Japan due to
engagements in the Far East, Central Asia and Africa around the
same time, while retaining ad hoc treaties to deal with the Americas.
The Moroccan Crisis
Imperial overstretch also played a significant role in Britain’s
decision to side with France in the Moroccan Crisis. In the shortterm, imperial overstretch had almost no impact on Britain’s
decision to oppose the Kaiser. Britain had already started to become
suspicious of Germany, not just because of their battlefleet, but also
because of the ambitious Kaiser’s general ambition of Weltpolitik.39
Furthermore, Britain’s good faith was on trial with France.40 To
retain this, Britain had to at least support France in a diplomatic
sense against Germany. However, considering the longer-term
build-up to the Moroccan Crisis, imperial overstretch clearly was a
factor. Britain had historically been concerned with Morocco due to
its proximity to Gibraltar, one of the ‘five keys’ to the world. 41 More
importantly, Britain’s ‘trial of faith’ with France was only on the
line because of the Entente Cordiale between the two nations on 8
April 1904, despite no binding pledge.42 Principally, Britain joined
the entente due to imperial overstretch. The Entente Cordiale
established British legitimacy in Egypt while Britain accepted
French dominance in Morocco. Regarding Africa, Kennedy
described it as ‘yet another challenger to the British world position

36

Christopher Clarke, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe went to war in 1914
(London: Allen Lane, 2012), p. 139.
37
Monger, p. 63.
38
Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, p. 297.
39
Paul Kennedy, ‘Reflections on Wilhelm II's place in the making of German
foreign policy', in: John C.G. Röhl/Nicolaus Sombart (Eds.): Kaiser Wilhelm II.
New Interpretations (London, 1982), p.160.
40
Taylor, p. 417
41
Epkenhans, p.116, as described by First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher.
42
Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914
(Amherst, 1988), p. 427.
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satisfied’.43 However, the key factor in Britain joining the Entente
Cordiale and subsequently the Moroccan Crisis, was again the Far
East, with the Russo-Japanese War 1904-5. In similar terms to the
Anglo-Japanese agreement, France had an agreement with Russia,
that if Russia was attacked by two or more powers they would aid
the Russians.44 Britain had the same agreement with Japan.45
Therefore, both France and Britain had a considerable interest in not
being a third party to the war, as this would mean the other was
obliged to join. From both perspectives, the Entente was as much
eliminating the threat of war than it was about making allies.46 Thus,
imperial overstretch forced Britain into the alliance with Japan. This
alliance, as well as appeasing colonial disputes in Africa, was behind
the Entente Cordiale. The agreements with France over Morocco
then dictated Britain’s policy in the Moroccan Crisis, whereby they
offered France support. Subsequently, Britain’s involvement in
European quarrels stemmed from imperial overstretch, primarily in
the Far East but also in Africa.
Conclusion
To conclude, the German battlefleet had little impact on Britain
ending splendid isolation by signing the Anglo-Japanese Agreement
and was barely a concern to the British Foreign Office and
policymakers. Anglo-German antagonism was not the major
determinant of British foreign policy.47 Instead, the alliance was due
to Britain’s global interests in the Far East and Central Asia, and to
a lesser extent in Africa and the Americas, becoming too much a
burden to defend alone. By the time of the Moroccan Crisis, the
German battlefleet had registered slightly more on Britain’s foreign
policy. Therefore, the German battlefleet may have played some
factor in Britain’s opposition to Germany, but this impact would
have been negligible at most. Britain opposing the Kaiser was
mainly due to their entente with France, which from the British side
was yet another example of attempting to administer their imperial
affairs. This essay has focused mainly on imperial overstretch and
focused on the German battlefleet only as a secondary factor. This
is because, no matter which side of the historiographical debate one
takes (whether splendid isolation ended in 1902 or 1905-6), the main
reason for the end of splendid isolation was imperial overstretch, not
the German battlefleet programme. This challenges the traditional
43

Paul Kennedy, The realities behind diplomacy: background influences on
British external policy, 1865-1980 (London: Fontana Press, 1985), p. 122.
44
Monger, p. 2.
45
Ibid, p. 62.
46
Young, p. 29.
47
Clarke, The Sleepwalkers, p. 141.

Published by New Prairie Press, 2020

7

Crossing Borders: A Multidisciplinary Journal of Undergraduate Scholarship, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 4

historiographical debates on the build-up to the First World War,
which often prioritise Anglo-German antagonism as the major
determinant of Great Power politics and subsequently the break-out
of war. Instead this essay suggests Anglo-German antagonism was
secondary to other factors, at least in the medium-term build-up to
the First World War.
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